Card-present payments involve a physical card or mobile wallet interacting with a terminal, while card-not-present payments include ecommerce, telephone and other remote transactions. The channels can use the same underlying card account but expose the merchant to different fraud, authentication and evidence risks.
Card-present transactions use a physical acceptance environment
In-store payments can use chip and PIN, contactless card or digital wallet at an approved terminal. The payment system receives physical-device and card data that is not available in ordinary remote checkout.
Merchants still need terminal security, staff controls and PCI compliance.
Card-not-present covers ecommerce and remote entry
Online checkout, payment links and MOTO are card-not-present because the physical card is not read by the merchant terminal.
Fraudsters can therefore use stolen card details from anywhere, making device, customer history and authentication data more important.
Ecommerce often uses Strong Customer Authentication
UK remote electronic payments can require SCA under the regulatory framework, commonly delivered through 3-D Secure for cards.
MOTO transactions are classified differently and should not be mislabelled as telephone orders merely to avoid an authentication challenge.
Fraud patterns differ by channel
Card-present fraud can involve stolen cards, terminal tampering or contactless misuse. Card-not-present fraud can involve account takeover, card testing and stolen credentials.
Use controls suited to the channel rather than one generic fraud rule across store, app and call centre.
Dispute evidence differs
An in-person merchant can have chip, PIN, terminal and receipt data. An ecommerce merchant can rely more on 3-D Secure results, device records, shipping and customer communication.
Store the evidence generated naturally by each channel so chargeback teams are not reconstructing it after a dispute.
Acquirer pricing can vary by channel and card type
Card-not-present transactions can carry different risk and processing economics from in-person sales. Commercial and international cards add further variation.
Compare effective merchant cost by channel, including fraud and chargebacks, rather than only the nominal acquiring percentage.
Worked example: a retailer accepts a £500 sale in-store with chip and PIN and another £500 sale online. The gross revenue is identical, but the fraud signals, authentication route, fulfilment evidence and likely chargeback defence differ materially.
Segment approval, fraud and refund rates by channel. A strong store business can hide poor ecommerce economics if finance blends all card transactions into one merchant-service percentage.
Train staff who work across channels. A call-centre employee moving a customer from MOTO to a secure payment link should know that the underlying payment classification and security responsibilities change.
Worked example: a merchant has £2 million monthly in-store sales and £2 million online sales. If online fraud and chargebacks are five times higher, blending the channels into one 1.2 percent payment-cost ratio hides the operational problem. Finance should report processing cost, fraud and approval separately by channel.
Use separate merchant IDs or reporting tags where volume justifies it. This makes it easier to identify whether one channel drives disputes or settlement delays.
For omnichannel refunds, define whether an ecommerce purchase can be refunded in store and how the systems link the original transaction. Staff should not issue cash for a card-not-present purchase without evidence and policy support.
Review SCA exemptions and terminal authentication independently. A customer tapping a physical wallet at a terminal and a customer using the same wallet online can pass through different authentication paths even though the funding card is identical.
Use different transaction limits and manual-review thresholds by channel. A £3,000 in-store chip-and-PIN purchase can have a different risk profile from a £3,000 first-time ecommerce order shipping internationally.
Keep merchant contracts and PCI scope current as channels expand. Adding telephone orders or an ecommerce site to a previously in-store-only business can change validation requirements and fraud exposure materially.
Review liability shifts and authentication evidence with the acquirer. Chip, contactless and 3-D Secure can affect who bears certain fraud disputes, but the merchant should not assume any technology guarantees protection in every chargeback scenario.
For click-and-collect orders, decide whether the payment is treated as card-not-present even though the customer later appears in store. The payment channel is determined by how the card transaction was initiated, not where the goods are handed over.
Keep fraud tooling aligned with fulfilment speed. Card-present sales often deliver goods immediately, while ecommerce merchants can hold higher-risk orders for manual review before dispatch. The available response time should influence fraud controls and loss tolerance.
Review chargeback reason mix by channel. In-store disputes can focus on card use and service, while online disputes can include non-receipt, account takeover and subscription issues. Prevention work should follow the actual dispute pattern.
Review insurance and fraud-loss assumptions by channel. A company expanding quickly online should not use historic in-store fraud percentages in its cash forecast or risk budget.
Editorial Verdict
Card-present and card-not-present payments need different operational controls even when the customer uses the same card account.
Match authentication, fraud screening and evidence to the channel and measure economics separately. Treating all card sales as identical hides the risks that matter most.
Sources
- FCA, Strong Customer Authentication: https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/strong-customer-authentication
- PCI SSC, Standards: https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/standards/
- Stripe UK, Online and in-person payments: https://stripe.com/gb/payments